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Abstract: Regulations and institutional factors can determine economic performance by 
influencing the efficiency with which  the product and labour markets  operate. This paper reviews 
the main theoretical channels by which regulation can have an impact on economic outcomes, such 
as productivity, investment, innovation and employment, and examine some of the empirical 
relationships found in the literature. The paper highlights evidence that points to positive effects that 
de-regulation of the product markets have on performance, , focusing especially on  the indirect 
effects associated  with de-regulation of key services sectors. Special attention is paid to two services 
sectors widely sheltered from competition forces, namely professional services and the financial 
sector. The paper also discusses aspects of labour market regulation. It concludes that the channels 
underpinning associations between regulation and performance in service sectors remain largely 
unexplored and further empirical work is needed.   
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Traditionally the regulation of markets has had a variety of motivations, some economic others more 
politic. While certain regulatory provisions aim to address public interest and concerns about market 
failures, such as monopoly conditions, externalities and asymmetric information problems, others 
serve key social objectives such as health and safety and the environment. Labour regulation in 
particular sets floors under wages and working conditions.  
Regulation can be flawed and can distort firm and market behaviour, and does not always result in a 
more efficient or desirable allocation of resources. It is thus recognised that regulation can have 
negative as well as positive effects on economic performance (BERR, 2008) and that the negative 
effects can be of a direct or an indirect nature (Crafts 2006, Economy Review 2004). It is said that 
regulation leads to “government failures” when the costs exceed the benefits. 
The direct negative effects of regulation are associated with the diversion of resources towards 
compliance and away from the creation of productive output; regulation is often seen as a tool to 
create rents for bureaucrats or incumbent firms with the state often holding direct or indirect 
control of the service providers1. The indirect channels involve those regulations creating entry 
barriers, and altering wider incentives to invest, innovate or accumulate human capital; it is widely 
considered that product market regulations affect the market structure of an economy.  
During the last decades many countries have implemented significant regulatory reforms of their 
product markets; they have reformed key network sectors, reduced administrative burdens and 
barriers to start-up, and have further opened domestic markets. With regards to labour market 
there has been a tendency to reduce stringency of employment protection legislation (EPL) thus 
making it easier to hire and fire workers.  Despite this, the heterogeneity in the levels of product and 
labour market regulations and in the pace of the reforms remains substantial, and regulation is 
increasingly considered to be a major factor in explaining differences in aggregate performance 
across countries (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003); an increasing number of studies in the literature 
investigate empirically the extent to which cross-country differences in key economic outcomes are 
related to policies and institutions that shape the business environment.   
The focus of this literature review is on quantifying the extent to which anti-competitive regulation2 
in services sectors, as opposed to regulations in the public interest (e.g. by addressing market 
failures) has an effect on economic  performance. For the services sector, several economic studies 
have previously investigated the relationship between institutional settings and economic 
performance, usually focusing on the impact on the growth of employment3, value added4 and 
productivity5. Factors other than the regulation influencing multifactor productivity in services have 
been investigated and these include R&D and innovation, ICT use, and labour force qualifications.6 
See Nicoletti (2001) for a review of developments in the services sectors.  
 
 
We will also discuss measurement issues of such regulation, and its consequences for employment 
and productivity. Of particular interest will be the extent to which indicators of regulation can be 
adapted to analyse employment and productivity in services sector (rather than whole economy). 
                                                 
1Scherer and Ross (1990) highlight several sources of waste associated to public industries: “Companies spend substantial sums attempting 
to use political and regulatory processes to erect artificial barriers, impose other limitations to competition and defend themselves when 
their conduct is considered breach anti-trust laws”  
2 See Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 
3 See D’Agostino (2006), Graf et al (2008), Messina (2005). 
4 See  Badinger and Breuss (2006). 
5 See Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Arnold et al (2008). 
6 See e.g. Kegels et al (2008). 
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For brevity, we will skirt the debate about the “legal origin” causes of regulation7. While this debate 
is another approach to examining the efficiency of regulation, we will concentrate on direct analysis 
of regulation’s effects, again with emphasis on services.  
 
2. Theoretical Channels  
 
2.1 Product Market Regulation 
2.1.1 Productivity and Innovation 
Theory suggests that the reform of product markets could enhance productivity through three main 
different channels (Nicodeme and Sauner-Leroy 2007, Griffith and Harrison 2004): a) through the 
process of reallocation of resources - allocative efficiency -; b) through the improvement on the 
production factors -productive efficiency, and/or c) through the incentive for firms to innovate –
dynamic efficiency -.  
 
Allocative efficiency 
Reforming product markets could enhance productivity by facilitating the reallocation of capital and 
labour to the production of the goods that the consumers value more, thus enabling a more efficient 
allocation of resources; this type of gain is known as “allocative efficiency”. The types of 
restructuring that can lead to increases in productivity can be of two types: internal and external 
(Criscuolo et al, 2004).While internal restructuring usually refers to changes in existing firms, 
external restructuring refers to the market selection mechanism by which less competitive firms exit 
the market and market shares are reallocated from lower to higher productivity firms. An important 
area of reform has been to make easier for firms to enter and exit a market. This has been driven by 
the governments in pursuit of growth through the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, 
which stresses the importance of entry and exit, as failing firms are replaced by new innovative 
firms. Some product market regulations may reduce the number of firms prevailing in a market and 
provide firms with market power. These types of regulations often take the form of administrative 
procedures, and introduce barriers to entrepreneurship by making it difficult to set up new firms and 
create new jobs. They are more likely to affect small and medium-sized enterprises, which have 
been regarded in the literature as the key drivers of competition, growth and job creation. 
 
Productive efficiency 
Product market reforms are also likely to have an impact on the productive efficiency in the 
economy. This type of efficiency is related to the improvement in the utilisation of factors of 
production by firms, meaning that firms move closer to the technological frontier. Product market 
deregulation increases competitive pressures among incumbents, raising the elasticity of product 
demand; this increase in consumer price sensitivity will tend to drive less productive firms out of 
business. Greater competition may thus increase the incentives to reduce X-inefficiency, organise 
work more efficiently, and foster the introduction of new and/or better production processes.  
 
In the principal-agent literature with asymmetric information it is argued that in competitive 
markets there are more incentives to reduce slack in managers and workers than in those markets 
less exposed to competition8. In firms subject to agency problems, productive efficiency may 
increase as a result of product market reforms because firms try to cut costs to prevent loss of 
market share when there exists threat of entry of new competitors (Hart 1983). Aghion, Dewatripont 
and Rey (1999) argue that by reducing the amount of slack in a manager, competition acts as a 
disciplinary device which enhances technological adoption and growth.  If competition reduces the 
                                                 
7 on the one side, see Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), on the other Deakin et al (2007) 
8  In the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith. “Monopoly is a great enemy to good management” 
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agency problem decentralization is more likely. Acemoglu et al (2007) formulate theoretical 
predictions by which young firms and firms dealing with new (frontier) technologies are the ones 
most likely to choose decentralization.  
 
Instead, in imperfect competition, managers can reduce their efforts without the same risk of going 
out of business. Haskel and Sanchis (1995) find that workers’ effort is higher in the private sector 
than in the public sector.  Private sector firms are only concerned with profits so insist on a high level 
of effort, whereas public sector firms are assumed to have broader social objectives and allow lower 
levels of effort.  
 
Dynamic efficiency 
Increased product market competition is considered to also increase the dynamic efficiency in an 
economy, by providing incentives for businesses to innovate and adapt, activities that are 
considered a crucial determinant of competitiveness and growth in the long run. In early industrial 
organisational models however, competition is considered detrimental for productivity growth 
because it reduces the monopoly rents that reward new innovations. In endogenous growth models 
where new innovation can only be made by entering firms, such as Aghion and Howitt (1998) and 
Aghion and Howitt (1992), patents protects monopoly rents from innovation and increased product 
market competition destroys these rents. In other endogenous models such as Barro and Sala-i-
Marti (1995), Klette and Griliches (2000) and Aghion et al (2005a) incumbents are allowed to 
innovate but entry is fixed.  In Aghion et al (2005b) it is the threat of entry that encourages 
innovation by incumbents. In these models, monopolists may innovate more than entrants in 
response to an increase in competition because of the reduction in total industry profits that the 
incumbent could suffer due to entry9. This is known as the “escape competition”(or rent dissipation) 
effect.  
 
Another stream of models argue that monopolists have less incentive to innovate, (e.g. invest in 
R&D) than a a firm in a competitive market due to the so-called “replacement effect” (Tirole 1988).  
A firm with monopoly position in a market has a flow of profits that it enjoys even if no innovation 
takes place; while the monopolist can increase its profits by innovating, it can also lose profits from 
ceasing to use the old technology. If a firm in a competitive market can reap the same benefit from 
innovating as the monopolist its differential return is higher because it does not have monopoly 
profits to be replaced by the innovation (Arrow 1962). 
 
In order to reconcile predictions of different models it is crucial to understand the interplay between 
levels of competition, changes in competitive conditions and innovative behaviour, arguing that a 
variety of forces may be at work10. Aghion et al (2005a) show that the relationship between the 
intensity of competition and innovation may be non-linear, in particular, of an inverted-U shape. For 
low initial levels of competition the “escape competition” effect mentioned above tends to 
dominate. When there is not much competition in a market, an increase in competition may 
increase the incremental profits from innovating and thereby encourage innovation activities such as 
R&D investments aimed at “escaping competition”. They demonstrate that the Schumpeterian effect 
or “replacement effect” tends to dominate for higher levels of competition.  
 
In this setting, the incentives are likely to depend not so much on the post-innovation rents but on 
the difference between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents. More product market competition 
                                                 
9 Schumpeter’s works not only emphasize the role of creative destruction for economic growth, but also stresses the importance of large 
incumbent firms in innovation (Schumpeter 1942). Acemoglu and Cao (2010) show that the two ideas are not contradictory and provide a 
theoretical framework where innovation can be simultaneously undertaken by new firms and by existing establishments.  
 
10 Vives (2008) provides a theoretical framework to analyse the effects of competition on process and product innovation on a variety of 
market structures and modes of competition.  
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may foster innovations and growth because it may reduce a firm’s pre-innovation rents by more 
than it reduces its post-innovation rents. In reality, the effects of product market competition on 
innovation can be diverse, depending on factors such as the technological characteristics of the 
industries, or the distance of a country to the technological frontier. Productivity growth depends on 
the potential to catch up and the ability to innovate, with the latter being more important the closer 
a country or a firm is from the technological frontier. It is particularly in “neck-and-neck” sectors, 
where firms are technologically more similar,  where increased competition will foster innovation in 
order to “escape competition”. With regards to the overall effect in the economy, the higher the 
average proportion of neck-and-neck industries in the economy the stronger the “escape 
competition” effect on average growth and therefore the steeper the positive part of the inverted-U 
relationship between product market competition and innovation.  
 
2.1.2 Investment and Human Capital 
One of the channels by which regulation can indirectly affect productivity is through capital 
investment. Regulation can have effects on the incentives of firms to upgrade capital stock and 
adopt new technologies to reach frontier production techniques. Regulation influences the cost that 
existing firms face when expanding their capital stock, deviating resources from productive uses 
such as the capital accumulation (see Alesina et al, 2005). Regulation may also impose a ceiling on 
rates of return of capital and this may affect the demand of capital relative to labour (Blanchard and 
Giavazzi 2003). In principle, the effects that regulatory reform in product markets can have on 
overall capital formation are uncertain (Faini et al, 2006). If regulatory reform involves changes in 
ownership structure it may have an effect on investment. For example, deregulation initiatives such 
as privatisation of public enterprises  may decrease overall investment given the significant amount 
of investment undertaken by the public sector .   
 
Investment in intangible factors has increased considerably in recent years, leading to higher 
productivity growth. The literature envisages an impact of product market deregulation on the 
accumulation of human capital. As in the case of innovation behaviour theoretical models yield 
ambiguous predictions on the sign of this relationship. Bassanini and Brunello (2010) argue that on 
one hand deregulation of markets reduces the amount of rents that can be appropriated by firms 
undertaking training. On the other hand deregulation encourages entry and thereby raises output 
and profit gains from training and improving investment incentives. This is equivalent to the “escape 




Trade has been regarded as an important sectoral growth driver (EC 2008). It is widely recognised 
that the most important impediments to trade in services are behind-the border regulations. The 
theoretical literature indicates that lowering barriers to the inward flow of goods and services will 
increase the degree of competition and thus lead to reductions in the mark-up.  Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008) show that larger markets exhibit tougher competition resulting in lower average 
mark-ups and higher aggregate productivity.  Influential work by Melitz (2003) demonstrates how 
trade-induced reallocations towards more efficient firms should explain why trade may generate 
aggregate productivity gains without necessarily improving productive efficiency of individual firms; 
this can be attributed to the fact that firms will self-select into export markets, with the most 
productive firms within the sector the ones that become exporters.   
 
2.1.4 Employment  
 
Product market regulations that hinder competition can have important effects on labour market 
performance. In imperfectly competitive markets firms restrict output and employment; hence an 
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increase in competition in the product markets should bring prices closer to marginal costs, raising 
the output demanded by the consumers and the labour demanded by the producers.  
 
In Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)’s influential theoretical paper, easing anti-competitive regulations 
lead to employment gains, at least in the medium to long-run. In their model deregulation is defined 
as a process of reduction and redistribution of rents with dynamics of adjustment. By lowering the 
price of goods, deregulation in the product market raises the real wage and by reducing barriers to 
entry to new firms leads to an increase in output and a fall in unemployment. In the short run 
however, incumbent firms may shrink, increasing the risk of unemployment for currently employed 
workers, even if overall unemployment eventually falls. The size of the employment effects will 
depend on the features of labour market institutions and on the type of product market reform 
implemented. For a summary of other channels by which deregulation of product markets can have 
an effect on employment outcomes see the theoretical discussions in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) 
and OECD (2002). Given the ambiguity between possible short and long run effects, empirical 
analysis should shed some light on the theoretical predictions.  
 
 
3.1 Labour Market Regulation 
Labour market regulation is designed to raise minimum wages (either via direct minimum wage laws 
or via extended collective agreements) and improve working conditions. Consequently it will affect 
job opportunities, including long-term unemployment, wage differentials and labour productivity. 
Labour regulation is multi-dimensioned but evidence shows that countries that are strict on one 
dimension tend to be strict on others. We set out the various dimensions of labour regulation and 
what theory says about the likely impact on economic performance.  
 
First, labour market regulation sets a floor under wages via minimum wage laws, laws extending 
collective agreements, and unemployment, sickness and retirement benefits. Under this heading we 
might also put trade union regulation, that is, laws supporting trade unions and strike action since 
trade unions negotiate agreements, monitor wages, and in some cases administer unemployment 
and other benefits. A further aspect is laws encouraging “social partners” to reach agreements on 
labour matters: such laws encourage centralisation and coordination of collective bargaining which 
has been found to be an important part of labour regulation.  
 
Second, there are the floors under working conditions. There are many areas here: working hours 
limitation, anti-discrimination laws for gender/age/disability and part-time vs. full-time or temp. vs. 
perm., worker participation laws (for example, requiring elected works councils), employment 
protection laws (EPL) restricting the firm’s right to dismiss, transfer of undertaking laws designed to 
preserve wages and conditions when businesses are bought and sold, and health and safety laws. 
With regards to labour market regulation it is important to distinguish between rules which simply 
add to labour costs (such as mandatory sick pay) and rules which raise the cost of employment 
adjustment (such as employment protection legislation).  
 
According to a first strand of the literature, employment security is considered important because 
productivity improvements depend on participation of workers, which would be undermined if 
employees think that they are at risk of losing the job. Under these conditions, easing the conditions 
to hire and fire may reduce the workers’ motivation and commitment and delay the introduction of 
labour saving technological progress, thus lowering productivity. The role of employment laws also 
relates to the issue of adverse selection. Distinguished economists such as Lawrence Summers 
(1989) have pointed out that adverse selection can prevent negotiation of job security provisions 
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since these have an insurance-like nature, and asymmetric information prevents the firm from 
screening out the bad risks (lazy workers). If a single firm has strong employment security, it will 
attract less capable workers that will be very difficult to be laid-off. But adverse selection is not a 
convincing practical reason, firstly, because EPL and unemployment benefits are not negatively 
related. Countries with high benefits also tend to have high EPL; the correlation across OECD 
countries is 0.16 (Bassanini and Duval, 2006), and across Botero et al’s (2004) larger set of countries 
is 0.32 (Siebert, 2007, Figure 4). Secondly, because since EPL does not appear really to act to 
increase job security, and it can be argued that EPL just helps a group of “insiders”. As Saint-Paul 
(2002) argues, insider groups bring about and maintain EPL to protect rents. This line of reasoning is 
supported by Aghion et al’s (2010) recent paper which shows that regulation is more likely in 
countries with low levels of trust as measured in the World Values Survey (e.g., with questions like 
“Would you say most people can be trusted?”). Beliefs and institutions “co-evolve”, they say (2010, 
0146). (For more on the determinants of trust, see Tabellini, 2010, also Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). 
The end result is a “low trust, heavy regulation and low output” equilibrium. Of course, more needs 
to be done to test this argument, which is where work on service industries labour regulation should 
offer new insights into this issue. 
 
EPL attracts particular interest, because it confers the valuable right of job security, while at the 
same time striking at the heart of labour adjustment and reallocation.  Nickell and Layard (1999) 
argue that the role of employment protection and minimum wages is overemphasised in the 
literature. They argue that key labour market institutions on which policy should focus are unions 
and social security systems; encouraging product market competition is also regarded a key policy to 
eliminate the negative effects of unions. A similar conclusion is provided by Layard et al (1991) in 
their famous work on unemployment; they argue that it is bargaining coordination (corporatism) 
rather than centralisation which is important, though it is controversially hard to define. The 
coordination/corporatism variable has been used to show (Nickell, 1997) that the bad effects of 
unions for jobs are nullified if unions and employers can coordinate their bargaining. (On the other 
hand, Summers et al (1993), have pointed out the “striking” correlation between corporatism and 
heavy taxation – and taxation is bad for jobs11).  Still, the conclusion has to be that both wage and 
working conditions regulation have many dimensions – and interact with the tax-benefit system 
since higher unemployment benefits for example also act as a wage floor –, all of which need to be 
considered. For social security the key policies are benefit reform linked to active labour market 
policies aimed to move people from welfare to work. It is thus important to distinguish between 
good working conditions (and wages) that are negotiated and those that are mandated.  Agell (1999) 
argues that “reforms that fail to distinguish between good and bad rigidities will do more harm than 
good”.  
 
3.1.1 Employment  
 
Theoretical models highlight several factors as determinants of long-run employment rates. These 
include the levels of real demand of an economy - monetary policy instruments can also move 
demand and employment towards equilibrium levels consistent with inflation - , the ability to match 
individuals to available job vacancies etc (Nickell et al, 2005). However the key issue for 
unemployment is whether or not wages adjust to offset the extra labour costs associated with many 
existing labour market regulations and institutions.  
 
Despite efficiency considerations, if regulation increases unemployment, its efficiency is 
automatically called into question. Siebert (2007) argues that if employment increases, we have 
efficiency in the sense that the gains of the gainers will be greater than the losses of the losers, if any 
                                                 
11 see also Bassinini and Duval (2006, 35) on this correlation 
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– that is, a (potential) Pareto improvement. If it decreases, however, the gains of the gainers will be 
less than the losses of the losers.  
 
It is necessary to consider the long-term unemployment rate as well as the overall rate when 
analysing labour regulation’s effects. From the very beginning, with Nickell’s (1982) work, it has been 
noted that EPL will have countervailing effects on inflows and outflows into and out of 
unemployment, leaving the outcome for the overall unemployment rate ambiguous. However, this 
research has made a homogeneous labour assumption, and the picture becomes different with 
disaggregation because wages and working conditions floors should impact most on the least 
productive. In other words, employers are likely to spend more on recruiting and emphasise 
education (see Daniel and Siebert, 2005), and also avoid workers at the two ends of the age 
distribution, thereby pushing up unemployment for the young and early retirement for the old. 
Thus, with heterogeneous labour, a composition effect resulting from labour regulation could clearly 
be strong. Whether this composition effect will be stronger or weaker in services (typically high 




3.1.2 Productivity and Innovation  
 
According to theory, the impact that employment protection legislation has on productivity is 
ambiguous. Early labour economics literature emphasized the beneficial effects that employment 
protection legislation (through an effect on tenure) has on worker motivation, training, wages and 
productivity. It is claimed that labour market regulations can remedy market failures and improve 
efficiency; under certain conditions, institutional features such as unions, minimum wages and 
unemployment benefits may promote a more efficient resource allocation (Agell,1999). However 
restrictions on hiring and firing increases costs for firms of adjusting the workforce and therefore 
hinder reallocation of resources  in activities likely to require adjustment such as investment in new 
technologies. The endogenous growth literature highlights that the most important mechanisms by 
which labour market institutions could affect productivity growth is via human and capital physical 
accumulation, innovation and entry and exit of firms (Barro, Sala i Marti 1995). 
 
The inelastic adjustment of wages and employment to economic shocks is considered a detrimental 
factor for productivity and employment. Labour market regulation may hinder the ability of firms to 
find the best mix of technology and organisational structure given uncertainty associated to 
innovative investments (Bartelsman et al, 2003). Employment protection laws slow down the 
reallocation from old and declining sectors to new and dynamic sectors therefore reducing the 
growth rate of productivity.  While the theory suggests both beneficial and detrimental effects 
associated with labour market institutions, the costs of maintaining  those institutions that hinder 
labour market flexibility may be rising with globalisation. 
 
We aim to identify outward shifts of the labour demand curve, rather than movements up or down it 
caused by the composition effect. A confusing picture of the effects of labour regulation on labour 
productivity can thus emerge from the fact that per hour and output per capita can move quite 
differently depending, for example, upon the course of hours worked (Storm and Naastepad 2009; 
Kilicaslan and Taymaz 2008).  It is quite possible for labour productivity to move in an opposite 
direction to employment if the regulation cuts the least skilled out of work (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 
2008), so that the remainder of the labour forces is composed of higher productivity individuals – 
the “composition” effect. Evidence (OECD, 2007) suggests that the composition effect is very real. To 
capture true productivity increases – outwards shifting of the labour demand curve – we must 




The effects of restrictions on hiring and firing workers on innovation and productivity are likely to be 
influenced by the characteristics of the industrial relation regimes. Labour market regulation can 
increase workers’ bargaining power; if workers are capable of appropriating a higher share of the 
rents resulting from innovation and productivity improvements, regulation reduces the incentives to 
innovate. In decentralized wage-bargaining regimes, incentives to innovate and adopt new 
technologies depend significantly on workers' bargaining power. When bargaining occurs at the 
national level, a firm’s incentive to undertake innovative investment does not depend on the 
bargaining power of its own workers.  
 
Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) argue that the potential effects of bargaining regimes and EPL on the 
incentives to innovate and adopt new technologies may also depend on the technological 
characteristics of the sector in which firms operate. In low-tech industries high firing costs are likely 
to lead to higher adjustment costs, with possible negative effects on innovation and adoption.  
 
3.1.3 Investment and Human Capital  
 
For productivity growth too many rules and regulations may hamper innovative investment (Nickell 
and Layard 1999). Traditional growth models have assumed that labour market rigidities reduce the 
equilibrium level of employment, and this decrease the marginal product of capital and the 
incentives to save and invest, ceteris paribus. Regulations that raise the cost of adjusting factor 
inputs, including labour, are likely to reduce the expected returns on innovation or investment 
aimed at adopting new technologies with negative effects on long-term growth.  
 
It has been argued that labour market institutions – unions, minimum wages’ laws, unemployment 
insurance- narrow wage distributions, and that this wage compression may reduce the incentives to 
accumulate human capital. Nevertheless, Agell (1999) points out to theoretical work showing that 
there are losses when market forces create excessive wage differentials and potential gains from 
institutions that promote a rigid and compressed wage structure. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) 
present a theoretical model where firms may want to invest in the general skills of their employees. 
Their model is based on a centralized or sectoral wage bargaining system where wages are 
compressed, and firms despite finding it more difficult to attract high skilled workers on the external 
market, gain from training their own workers. 
 
3.1.4 International Trade 
 
Helpman and Itskhoki (2009) construct a theoretical model that explains how rigidities in labor 
markets impact trade.  They show that rigidities in labour markets, in particular employment 
protection legislation reduce operating profits which lead to lower competitiveness of the firms. As a 
result firms are discouraged from exporting. It has also been noted that there appears to be a 
positive correlation between exposure to international trade and the scope of collective bargaining 
and centralisation of wage bargaining;  It is also noted that more open economies are likely to have 
minimum wages, strict job security legislation and generous unemployment benefits (Agell 1999). 
The popular argument (e.g., Agell, 1999) is that trade openness increases people’s demand for 
labour regulation, which is therefore an efficient response to the risks of trade. Despite the variety 





4. Regulations: Dimensions and Measures 
 
In this section we outline measurement efforts on product and labour market regulation. In order to 
assess the influence of product market regulation on the business environment, most empirical 
studies attempt to measure the degree of competition prevailing in a market, focusing either on 
direct observed measures (at macro, industry level or firm level) or on external or proxy measures of 
regulation.  
 
In the past the most commonly used measure of competition has been the price-cost margin12, or 
mark-up, to reflect the ability of a firm to set prices above marginal costs as it is expected from 
economic theory in perfectly functioning markets. Methodologically, estimates from mark-ups have 
mostly been obtained using the econometric framework of Hall (1988) or Roeger (1995), though the 
drawbacks of those methods have been outlined in the literature recently13. This led to the 
development of theoretically and empirically more robust measures, such as profit elasticity14. 
However, as firm-level data is required to compute this measure, it has only rarely been used in 
empirical analysis so far. Structural indicators such as the degree of industry concentration have also 
been traditionally employed to assess the degree of market power and evaluate the links to 
economic performance at industry level. Other works have used measures of rents or the Lerner 
Index (Nickell 1996) which are considered more advantageous measures than market shares, 
Herfindahl or concentration ratios.  
 
In recent years the degree of product market competition has been assessed by means of proxy 
measures such as the OECD Product Market Regulation Indicators at country level (Wölfl et al, 2009) 
or indicators such as the OECD indicators of Non-Manufacturing regulation (NMR indicators, see 
Conway and Nicoletti 2006) or the Regulation Impact indicators at industry level (Conway et al 
2006). These indicators aim to quantify a country’s (anti-competitive) regulatory burden and were 
developed to overcome problems of traditional indicators on the intensity of competition (e.g. 
measures of market power), such as their endogeneity. The NMR indicators include indicators of 
regulation in key service sectors such as transport, energy and communications,  where regulatory 
changes have been especially important (ECTR indicators). The Regulation Impact, or “knock on”, 
indicators aim to capture the extent to which regulation in non-manufacturing sectors has 
widespread consequences in other sectors of the economy. These type of indicators are increasingly 
employed in empirical research due to their suitability for panel data analysis.  
 
The search for better indices measuring labour market regulation is on-going. A time-varying 
indicator of labour regulation, particularly EPL, is of major importance. Both the Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney, 2010) and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom (Heritage, 2010) have labour regulation components. All these sources provide a 
time varying indicator of labour regulation which can be used more intensively in future research 
(but only for the last 10 years or so). Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have produced a time-varying 
index of EPL by linking Lazear’s (1990) index with the OECD’s index, and interpolating for missing 
years. A much longer time series, 1950-2003 has been produced by Allard (2005) using the OECD-
World Bank leximetric method of scoring labour legislation. 
 
                                                 
12 Another common measure to assess competition is the Herfindahl index, a measure of sectoral concentration of firms. However, both 
the mark-up and the Herfindahl and the price-cost margin suffer from sever theoretical drawbacks (see Tirole, 1988). 
13 See Hylleberg  and Jørgensen (1998) and Dobrinsky (2004). 
14 See Boone et al (2007). 
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5. Consequences: Empirical Evidence 
 
5.1 Product Market Regulation 
Despite suggestions in the literature of welfare gains associated to regulatory reform, the linkages 
between reforms and macroeconomic effects are not always clear, and empirical evidence is still 
scant. We investigate to what extent product market reforms, particularly those that affect the 
intensity of competitive pressures in the markets, have had a significant influence on economic 
outcomes such as investment, productivity and employment - ultimate determinants of GDP growth. 
We review evidence that considers developed and emerging economies15 and research making use 
of different methodologies such as general equilibrium and econometric techniques. Particular 
attention is paid to evidence regarding the services sectors. See Schiantarelli(2008) for an detailed 
review of evidence. 
 
Estimates suggest that the GDP per capita levels in OECD countries could increase by around 2 to 5 
percent if barriers to trade, investment and competition were reduced; with product market reforms 
that stimulate competition providing the largest part of the overall gains in GDP per capita (OECD 
2005a). The largest role of product market reforms compared to tariff lowering is attributed to the 
high level of domestic product market regulation particularly in services sectors. 
 
Bayoumi et al (2004) show that differences in competition can account for over half of the gap in 
GDP per capita between the Euro area and the US. They simulate greater competition in the euro 
area by lowering euro-area mark-ups in the model to the level of those in United States. They find 
that output could increase by 12.4 percent in the euro area as both investment and hours worked 
would rise markedly, and by 0.8 percent in the rest of the world through a favourable term of trade 
effect. This points to the existence of international spillovers derived of an increase in competition.  
 
For transition economies Commander and Svejnar (2007) find that the effect of business 
environment on several dimensions of performance is rather weak, contrary to other empirical 
results. They conclude that while country effects explain differences in performance it is difficult to 
attribute these effects to differences in the business climate.  Babetskii and Campos (2007) review 
43 econometric studies that look at the effect of structural reforms on the GDP growth rate also for 
transition economies 16. They show that only approximately one third of the studies find a positive 
role for reforms; the measurement of reform, the difficulty to controlling for the role of institutions 




That competition is an important determinant of productivity is found generally in firm level studies. 
Research such as Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al (1995) report a positive correlation between 
competition -measured by the number of competitors in the same industry or by the inverse of a 
market share or profitability index- and productivity growth within a firm or industry. Bloom and van 
Reenen (2010) show that competitive product markets are associated with better management 
practices. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) find a robust positive association between product 
market competition and decentralization. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen find that Anglo-Saxon and 
Northern European firms are much more decentralized than those from Southern Europe and Asia 
and this decentralisation allow the most efficient firms to grow. Using firm level data from the World 
                                                 
15 An important source of information that covers developing countries and transition economies as is the World Bank “Doing Business” 
database 
16 Empirical studies use the EBRD and World Bank liberalisation and reforms indices.  
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Bank Enterprise Survey Databse, Ospina and Schiffbauer (2010) show that countries that 
implemented product market reforms experienced stronger increases in competition and in 
productivity; the contribution of the increased competition to productivity growth is estimated to be 
around 12 to 15 percent.  
 
Griffith and Harrison (2004) find that regulatory reforms that have reduced the level of economic 
rents appear to be associated with lower levels of labour and total factor productivity, at both 
country and industry level. Loayza et al (2009a) look at the effect of regulation on the economic 
performance of a wide set of countries, including developing countries17; despite finding that both 
product market reform and trade reform have a positive and significant effect on productivity 
growth, they recognise that it may take time for the full effects to materialise. Loayza et al (2009b) 
find that the adverse effect of product market regulations is stronger on the components of 
productivity growth that reflect reallocation of resources between firms. Evidence points to the 
existence of large within-firm effects, but the within-firm component is found to make small 
contributions to MFP growth compared to labour productivity growth (Scarpetta et al, 2002).  
 
Empirical studies often have not been able to identify the impact of product market regulations and 
reforms on allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. The Economy Review 2004 presents in 
summary fashion the main empirical results found in the literature concerning the three types of 
efficiency gains. Recent studies attempt to estimate the importance of allocative efficiency gains.  
Following the decomposition of multifactor productivity in Olley and Pakes (1996), Arnold et al 
(2010) cross-sectionally decompose aggregate productivity gains into two terms: the average level of 
firm-level multi-factor productivity and the extent to which firms with greater efficiency have 
greater market share. They find a negative effect of the strictness of regulation on the allocative 
efficiency component of productivity, which originates mainly in the service sectors. Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) provide quantitative evidence on the potential impact of resource misallocation on 
aggregate for Multi Factor Productivity (MFP) for China and India; they find that important 
productivity gains could be accrued if capital and labour were allocated to equalise their marginal 
products across plants within narrowly defined sectors to the observed in the US. Despite this, they 
show that market reforms have reduced allocative efficiency particularly in China.  
 
Turning to dynamic effects several firm-level studies show that competition is likely to increase 
industry MFP mainly through the process of entry and exit (see Bartelsman and Doms 2000).  All find 
a significant role for reallocation in both entry and exit of firms in the United States and Europe but 
most of studies concern the manufacturing sector.  For a sample of UK manufacturing firms for 
period 1980-1992, Disney et al (2003) find that the entry of new firms contribute to the overall MFP 
growth because the new firms enter the market with a more efficient capital input mix and more 
advanced technologies.  Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin (2004) estimate that entry and exit 
contributed to 50 percent of the overall productivity growth during the 90s in the UK. For the US 
entry of new establishments (plants) accounts for about 25% of average MFP growth at the industry 
level (Bartelsman and Doms 2000).  Lentz and Mortensen (2008) find more significant role for entry.  
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) argue that the literature is likely to understate the 
productivity advantage of new producers and the contribution of entry to aggregate productivity 
growth. They show that entrants are more physically productive than incumbents but because 
young producers charge lower prices, revenue-based productivity measures tend to understate 
entrant’s productivity advantages.  
 
Poschke (2010) demonstrates that differences in entry costs explain to a large extent the observed 
differences in MFP between the US and other developed countries; the reduction in competition due 
to higher entry costs decreases the incentives to adopt more advanced technologies. In particular, 
                                                 
17 Using indicators from the World Bank, Heritage foundation and Fraser Institute.  
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he finds that small differences in administrative costs can explain around one third of differences in 
MFP. Barseghyan (2008) finds that an increase in entry costs by eighty percent of income per capita 
would reduce MFP by 22 percent. For Mexico Kaplan et al (2007) conclude that while is important to 
reduce the number of procedures and time required for firms to be registered, other aspects that 
can have an influence on firm creation, such as the burden of taxes and the access to credit cannot 
be neglected.  
 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find evidence that regulatory reform in terms of privatisation and 
entry liberalisation had a positive influence on total factor productivity growth in certain services 
sectors for a number of OECD countries. Nicoletti and Scarpetta find evidence of a negative 
relationship between total factor productivity growth and three economy-wide measures of 
regulation with the correlation being largest with the indicators of administrative burdens (which 
represent a uniform barrier to entry for business in most industries). Inklaar et al (2008) find that 
entry liberalisation has been beneficial for productivity growth in telecommunications, while the 
evidence for other services industries is not so clear. Over the last years 10-15 years the UK has been 
a good performer in services sectors (telecoms, electricity and wholesale and retail trade) and part 
of this is attributed to the introduction of competition (Maher and Wise 2005).  
 
While affecting all firms, strict regulations have particularly negative effects on firms in the most 
dynamic industries such as ICT industries (Conway et al, 2006, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find that product market regulation slows down catch-up productivity 
growth by hindering rapid reallocation of productive resources. In ICT industries, technological 
progress has been more rapid and there is greater potential to innovate and implement the latest 
technologies. This has been largely attributed to the fact that regulatory barriers to diffusion tend to 
be higher in these sectors compared to the rest of the economy. When there are rapid 
improvements in productivity the positive effects of pro-competitive regulations are amplified, 
increasing dispersion on productivity levels across countries with different regulatory regimes 
(Arnold et al, 2010). While affecting all types of firms, regulatory constrains are especially harmful 
for those with a significant gap with the technology leader. Structural and institutional factors may 
thus explain why ICT diffusion in Europe is still slow and its economic effects are hardly perceptible. 
Barrios and Burgelman (2007) show that the US was able to reap the benefits from ICT investment 
faster and to a greater extent than EU countries with similar specialisations in ICT-producing and ICT-
using industries.  
 
Several papers examine to what extent anti-competitive regulation in service sectors have an 
influence in other sectors of the economy; this is relevant given the increasing proportion of service 
inputs employed by manufacturing sector. Bourles et al (2010)18 find that excessive regulatory 
burden in key services sectors can curb productivity in downstream sectors. This result is stronger 
for observations closer to the technological frontier. Havik et al (2008) present similar evidence to 
explain productivity gap between European countries and the US, and Arnold et al (2008) provides 
similar conclusions for Czech firms. It has also been shown recently that the negative impact of 
restrictive regulation in upstream sectors on multifactor productivity performance is of a long-term 
nature, and affects especially the sectors using ICTs most intensively (EC 2009). Instead of using 
regulation proxies, Forlani (2010) evaluates the importance of the market structure of service 
sectors for French manufacturing firms; the results confirm a negative association between the level 
of concentration and mark-ups and the average productivity of downstream manufacturing firms.  
 
                                                 
18 Bourles et al (2010) construct indicators of regulatory burden for 20 sectors that use the outputs of non- manufacturing industries as 





Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999)19 use UK firm-level data to investigate why market 
dominance enables firms to be more innovative and shed light on the importance of the incentives 
to innovate. They find a positive correlation between market share and innovation and conclude 
that that high market share firms have greater incentives to pre-emptively innovate (“escape 
competition” effect). However Blundell et al also show that less competitive industries (those with 
higher concentration levels and lower imports) had fewer aggregate innovations, even though the 
higher market share firms innovated most frequently. Despite the evidence for manufacturing there 
is little empirical support for the view that large firm size or high concentration is strongly associated 
with a higher level of innovative activity, at least at an aggregate level. 
 
Marcos and Santalo (2010) find a strong negative association between regulation intensity and 
regional productivity and innovation in Spain. They do not find evidence at the regional level that the 
decrease in innovation and productivity is caused by lower product market competition. Instead 
they find that regulation has affected differently firms depending on their size; regulation has had a 
particularly detrimental effect in the largest establishments, which are traditionally  the ones most 
likely to innovate.  
 
Bassanini and Ernst (2002) look at the effect of regulation on innovation using the OECD indicators of 
regulation (rather than direct measures of competition) and measures of R&D intensity in a cross 
section of 18 OECD countries and 18 manufacturing industries. They report a negative association 
between R&D intensity and indicators of non-tariff barriers and inward-oriented economic 
regulation. Conversely, stronger protection of intellectual property rights tends to be positively 
associated with higher R&D intensity, although endogeneity problems do not allow them to identify 
this association as a causal relationship. Griffith et al (2006)20 find that an increased product market 
competition measured by reduction is associated with increase in innovation intensity in 
manufacturing.  
 
Several empirical studies assess whether there is a non-monotonic relationship between innovation 
and product market. Griffith and Harrison (2004) find that while there appears to be a non-linear 
relationship between the level of economic rents and levels of R&D expenditure and growth rates of 
labour and total factor productivity, in most countries a reduction in rents is associated with a 
reduction in R&D and growth rates. Using a semi-parametric approach, Aghion et al (2005a) show 
that an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation measured as patent counts 
holds within several industries, and the inverted-U relationship between competition and growth is 
steeper for more neck-and-neck industries.  Tingvell and Karpaty (2008) find that the inverted-U 
relation holds for both small and large service-sector firms in Sweden. Within services, Broersma and 
van Ark (2004) find evidence of an inverted U-shaped relation between competition and productivity 
growth only in retail trade and utility services. They use the price-cost average as an approximation 
of the price-cost margin, which measures industry concentration and hence competition.  
 
Aghion et al (2009) demonstrate that the threat of technologically advanced entry encourages 
incumbent innovation and productivity growth in sectors that are initially close to the technological 
frontier, whereas it may discourage incumbents in sectors further behind the frontier. In line with 
these results, Brandt (2004) finds that high rates of firm entry leads to productivity growth in ICT 
related services sectors although in more mature manufacturing industries R&D seems to play a 
larger role.  The implications of these results are relevant for policy making. Aghion et al (2009) 
argue that policies aiming at decreasing or removing product market barriers to entry alone may not 
                                                 
19 Blundell et al (1999) use UK firm level data  and consider innovation counts as measures innovation output; the  measures of 
competition include market shares, concentration and import penetration. 




be sufficient to foster growth of incumbent firms in all sectors of an economy. The results suggest 
the need for complementary labour and capital market institutions that facilitate the reallocation of 
factors and resources from less to more technologically developed sectors where incumbent firms 
respond more positively to higher entry threat. 
 
Ahn (2002) offers a comprehensive review of empirical studies studying the links between 
competition, innovation and long run productivity. Empirical findings are ambiguous but the recent 
literature agrees in that that for a given level of protection of intellectual property rights, product 
market competition – in a broad sense - is beneficial for innovation in the long run21. 
 
Investment and Human Capital  
Griffith and Harrison (2004) conclude that regulatory reform that stimulates competition in a market 
is likely to increase factor demand; however this is only observed for the services sectors, but not in 
manufacturing. On industry-specific regulations, Alesina et al (2005) find evidence that liberalisation, 
particularly on barriers to entry, is likely to enhance investment in network industries such as post 
and telecommunications, using the use time varying sector-country specific measures of regulation 
collected by the OECD for the period 1975-1998. Other papers have investigated the effects of 
regulation on FDI (Nicoletti et al, 2003) and the presence of foreign affiliates (Conway et al, 2006). 
Nicoletti et al (2001) demonstrate that the influence of policies and institutions on growth operates 
to a large extent through the accumulation of physical and human capital.  
 
To date there is little evidence on the impact of product market regulations on firm’s innovative 
investment. Gust and Marquez (2004) find that a burdensome regulatory environment (both 
employment protection legislation and business regulations) affects negatively the adoption of 
information and communications technology22 and this helps explain the productivity slowdown 
observed in many developed countries during the 1990s. Conway et al (2006) look at the link 
between product market regulation and investment in information and communications technology 
at both aggregate level and industry level. ). Arnold et al (2008) argue that the difference in the 
timing of the technological boom in ICT technologies and the regulatory reform process in Europe 
was a key factor hindering effective accumulation of ICT capital, in particular in services industries, 
where deregulation has been much slower to take place. At industry level recent evidence 
demonstrate that the relationship between stringency of the regulatory environment and ICT 
investment may be more important than for traditional types of investment (EC 2009).  
 
Bassanini and Brunello (2010) use cross section data from the European Labour Force Survey to 
investigate empirically the relationship between product market regulation (OECD indicators) and 
training incidence in a sample of 15 European countries and 13 industrial sectors. They show that 
deregulation increases training since the ”escape competition” effect prevails, in particular a 10 
percent reduction of regulation increases training incidence in the exposed industries by 2.8 to 5 
percent. 
 
International Trade  
There is a large amount of empirical research on trade liberalisation, and many studies show a 
positive relationship between openness and growth. Import penetration rate is sometimes used as a 
proxy for degree of foreign competition.  Regulation in services may affect negatively the efficiency 
of manufacturing by discouraging inflows of foreign direct investment. Evidence indicates that 
presence of foreign affiliates is associated with higher levels of MFP (Haskel et al 2007). Nicoletti et 
                                                 
21 Ahn (2002) argues that the existence of short-run market power does not necessarily imply lack of competition particularly in dynamic 
industries such as ICTs.  
 
22 Defined as office and computing equipment as well as radio, television and communication equipment. 
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al (2003) find that it is only when accompanied by appropriate domestic policies that trade openness 
facilitates competition, investment and productivity. Barrell and Pain (1997) finds that European 
integration had a substantial impact on the patterns and level of FDI within Europe, which was a key 
channel on the impact of competition on productivity.  
 
Employment 
Not much attention has been paid to cross-market effects, that is, to the influence of product 
market policies and regulations on the outcomes of the labour market and vice versa. Consistently 
with predictions in the model by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) find 
that significant employment gains can be obtained by deregulating product markets in overly 
regulated countries. They look at the influence of product market reform in employment in 20 
countries for the period 1980-2002 using the OECD proxies for developments in the regulation of 
seven non-manufacturing industries. Their findings show that regulations that curb competition and 
entry have had a negative impact that reduced significantly employment rates in OECD countries 
over the past three decades. After controlling for several policy and institutional factors in the labour 
market, anti-competitive product market regulations (such as barriers to entry in inherently 
competitive markets and restrictions in price competition) had a negative impact on the 
employment rates of the non-agricultural sector of the OECD countries (OECD 2002). Nicoletti et al 
(2001) estimate that the reduction of product market regulation from relatively high to relatively low 
levels would boost employment rates by around 2%.  
 
Griffith and Harrison (2004) find that the association of greater competition and higher levels of 
employment holds particularly in the service sector. Pissarides (2001) finds a negative correlation 
between a measure of start-up costs and employment rates across a small sample of OECD countries 
but Ebell and Haefke (2003) estimate that no more than half a percentage point of European 
unemployment rate can be attributed to the regulation of entry. Messina (2003) finds that the 
interaction between product market regulations that raise barriers to entry with supply and demand 
forces help explain observed differences in service sectors’ share of employment across countries in 
similar stages of economic development. Lopez-Garcia (2002) offers the similar conclusion. Those 
economies with unfriendly institutions to service job creation, such as higher start-up costs, were 
not able to have a smooth transition towards a service economy showing significantly lower service 
employment and higher unemployment.  
 
The results support the theoretical finding that at least in the long-run, increasing competitive 
pressures should be a priori good for employment since stimulates labour demand; it can thus be a 
useful complement to labour market reforms in increasing labour utilisation; they also show that 
employment gains are likely to be higher in countries that have rigid labour markets. The literature 
offers different predictions at when the product market deregulation may be more effective. 
Nicoletti et al (2000) observe that regulatory environments in the product market tend to be 
associated with restrictive employment protection policies. Fiori et al (2007) and Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2005) present evidence that product market deregulation is more effective at the margin 
when labour market regulation is high. A possible reason for this is that when liberalisation occurs, 
employment increases in part through the expansion of activity and entry of new firms but also due 
to a reduction in the wage-productivity gap as insiders lose bargaining power and share of rents. 
When labour markets are more flexible the employment gains are only obtained through the first 
channel.  
 
Recent evidence demonstrates that the size of the employment effects associated to product market 
deregulation may depend on the nature of the labour market institutions with Ebell and Hefke 
(2004) demonstrating that the relationship between product market competition and the degree of 
collective bargaining may in fact be endogenous. Using time-varying policy reforms to provide 
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exogenous variation in the product market conditions, Griffith et al (2007) show that the significant 
deregulation experienced by many OECD countries over the last twenty years was associated with 
increases in competition - measured by firms’ profitability -, and increases in aggregate employment 
and wages. They also estimate that in countries with higher levels of collective bargaining and/or 
union density the increase in employment is likely to be larger and the increase in real wages 
smaller. The reason for this is that unions who care about employment as well as wages are 
constrained by the level of competition in the product market. The issue of complementarity is 
explored further in papers such as Berger and Danninger (2006) and Nicoletti et al (2001). De 
Macedo and Oliveira (2008) show the importance of policy complementarities to enhance growth in 
transition countries.  
 
 
5.2 Labour Market Regulation 
Here we consider employment/unemployment consequences of labour market regulation on which 
there is much research, and also productivity consequences which are conceptually more difficult to 
isolate (more employment can simply mean lower productivity, so it is necessary to analyse total 
factor productivity). Finally we will summarise ways forward for research on labour regulation 
effects on productivity in the services specifically.  
 
Employment  
Considering research results in the context of heterogeneous labour, it is worth considering Koeniger 
et al’s (2007) research on wage differentials in 11 OECD countries 1973-99, using a time-varying 
measure of EPL (based on Blanchard and Wolfers 2000). After all, wage differentials only exist 
because labour is heterogeneous. They find that EPL strongly reduces wage differentials. This result 
is surprising because, since EPL bears most on the unskilled, their wage and thus wage differentials 
should rise with stricter EPL. The fact that the opposite happens implies that trade union power is 
using employment protection as a hold-up threat (Saint-Paul, 2002) to increase unskilled wages at 
the expense of unskilled unemployment.  
 
Siebert (2007) gives a picture of how earnings compression may adversely affect job opportunities. 
We see especially how young men’s employment/population ratio increases relative to prime age 
men as earnings differentials rise, with a correlation of 0.57. Older men (55+), and women appear to 
benefit, too. The implication is that we should look at marginal groups – unskilled labour markets, 
and unskilled labour-intensive industries – to really assess adverse employment effects. Taking 
overall employment and unemployment rates, comprehensive papers by Bassanini and Duval (2006) 
and Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) consider effects of the main forms of labour market regulation. 
Union density, and benefit replacement rates have an adverse effect (as do taxes), but EPL as such is 
minor in this context. However, neither paper considers marginal groups.  
 
Nickell and Layard (1999) do not find a significant effect from EPL on the total unemployment rate. 
However, when marginal groups are considered, EPL and strong unionism has more of an effect. In 
particular, for the over 55s, the research by Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2007) using a 17 country OECD 
dataset with a long time period 1960-96 finds strong adverse effects of union power for over 55s 
participation. They explain this result in terms of unions rationally pricing out of the labour market 
groups such as the old who have good non-employment alternatives such as (subsidised) early 
retirement. Interestingly (see Heywood and Seibert, 2009), there is no hint in their results of 
bargaining coordination reducing the adverse effects of union power. This research also finds 
adverse effects of EPL on older workers participation, as does that by Daniel and Siebert’s (2005) 
study of matched plants (both these studies use variants of the Blanchard-Wolfers (2000) EPL index). 
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Backing up the EPL finding is research on the negative employment effects of age discrimination 
legislation, since such legislation (Lahey, 2008) acts as a form of EPL. Again, the implication is that we 
need to search for the marginal groups to test for the employment consequences of labour 
regulation. 
 
We have seen it is necessary to get away from simple labour productivity, and analyse total factor 
productivity, which Bassanini et al (2009) show is likely to be reduced by EPL in industries with 
greater layoff propensity, and which are thus more affected by EPL. An alternative approach is to 
consider related variables such as the speed of employment adjustment which Caballero et al (2006) 
show is also reduced by EPL, once enforcement is taken into account. The Caballero et al (2006) 
finding is for a cross-section of countries using the Botero et al (2004) index of EPL, but their method 
could perhaps be extended to the industry level using the Bassanini et al (2009) technique, thereby 
providing a method for analysing regulatory effects on services vs. manufacturing labour 
adjustment.  
 
A third possibility is to take enterprise formation/entrepreneurship, following Kannianinen and 
Vesala (2005) as the dependent variable. Kannianinen and Vesala (2005) use a cross-country dataset 
with the OECD (2004) type of EPL measure, and show that their measure of entrepreneurship 
(basically, self-employment) is robustly negatively affected by EPL. The way in which employment 
laws reduce formal sector employment in developing countries (Besley and Burgess, 2004, Djankov 
and Ramalho, 2009) is related. Again, this approach seems open to the use of industry data which 
would therefore supply a view on service sector effects. 
 
Elmeskov et al (1998) review cross-country determinants of structural unemployment focusing on 
the role of labour market policies and certain institutional factors. The impact on the functioning of 
the labour market may depend upon the institutional framework within which they operate, and the 
interaction mechanisms are generally complex. Elmeskov et al find for the period 1983-1995 that 
different collective bargaining arrangements affect labour market outcomes. A high degree of co-
ordination on employer and employee sides can significantly reduce structural unemployment 
insofar as such coordination provides a mechanism by which economy-wide labour market 
conditions can be internalised in the wage-setting process, increasing the sensitivity of real wages to 
shocks. The positive impact on aggregate unemployment is stronger and statistically significant in 
countries with an intermediate degree of centralisation/co-ordination - where sectoral wage 
bargaining predominates with limited co-ordination.  These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that when insiders have strong bargaining power, they may more resilient to employers' 
attempts to reflect higher payroll taxes and/or high turnover costs  (due to strict EPL) in lower 
wages, even if this works to the detriment of outsiders. 
 
Nickell et al (2005) estimate that labour market institutions explain around 55% of the rise in 
European unemployment from the 1960s to the first half of the 1990s, finding that the combination 
of benefits and taxes are responsible for two-thirds of the rise in European unemployment that 
institutions explain. 
 
Productivity and Innovation 
The excessive labour market regulation prevailing in many European countries has been linked to 
their slow labour productivity growth performance.  According to the OECD work an excess of labour 
market regulation reduces productivity growth and technological progress (Elmeskov et al, 1998, 
Bassanini and Ernst, 2002, Scarpetta and Tressel, 2004).   
 
In an econometric analysis based on data for 17 manufacturing industries in 18 OECD countries 
(1980-2000), Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) find evidence that high labour adjustment costs (proxied 
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by the strictness of employment protection legislation) can have a strong negative impact on 
productivity. As well as institutional factors affecting labour costs they consider traditional growth 
factors, including technological catch up, human capital and R&D. Different industrial relations 
regimes per se do not have a significant impact on productivity. However, differences in these 
regimes seem to affect significantly the estimated impact of EPL on multifactor productivity.  In 
particular they find that when institutional settings do not allow wages or internal training to offset 
high hiring and firing costs, the latter reduce incentives for innovation and adoption of new 
technologies, and lead to lower productivity performance. This is the case when sectoral wage 
bargaining without coordination is predominant. 
 
A limitation of these type of studies is that available data does not allow differentiation of these 
labour market indicators by industry.  Further research should shed some light on the important of 
EPL for productivity in different industries.  While labour regulation is by nature economy-wide, 
recent research (Bassanini et al, 2009) has investigated whether employment protection has 
particular adverse effects in industries with high labour redundancy rates such as manufacturing. 
This research angle can potentially be applied to the service sector. 
 
Contrary to the above evidence Storm and Naastepad (2007, 2009) instead find that a more rigid 
labour market regulation (proxied by EPL and other characteristics of the industrial relations system) 
is associated with higher labour productivity growth. It is claimed that productivity gains depend 
largely on the cooperation of workers and their ideas in a setting where the workers have some 
degree of autonomy in decision making. This requires more training and it is only worth it if the 
employment relation is of long-term. This reasoning can also be found in Auer et al (2005) and 
Nickell and Layard (1999). Auer et al (2005) find a positive association between productivity growth 
and employment tenure.  
 
The idea that the rigidity of labour markets is the cause for lower productivity performance is put 
into question. The impact of labour market deregulation on unemployment is also discussed, 
questioning the idea that the rigidity of labour markets is associated with higher unemployment. 
They argue that it is because labour market regulation simultaneously raises wage claims as well as 
productivity growth that its impact on production and unemployment is likely to be small or even 
insignificant.   
 
A possible limitation of these papers is that they employ measures of labour productivity rather than 
measures of total factor productivity. Storm and Naastepad (2007) conclude the existence of a 
trade-off between productivity and employment growth: labour productivity growth is highest in 
those countries where employment growth is lowest and productivity growth is lowest where 
employment growth is highest. Storm and Naastepad (2009) compare the macroeconomic 
performance of three country groups according to their labour market regulation system (countries 
with a highly coordinated system that have high real wage growth, countries with highly coordinated 
system and low real wage growth, countries with liberal system and low real wage growth). Given 
the trade-off they find important differences in their productivity and employment patterns but GDP 
growth does not vary significantly between these groups. 
 
Griffith and Macartney (2010) investigate empirically the relationship between EPL, and innovation 
activity across twelve European countries and they demonstrate that the nature of the innovation 
has a role to play. They find both positive and negative effects of EPL on innovation incentives for 
firms thus reconciling different theoretical predictions. Multinational firms do more incremental 
patenting activity in countries with high EPL and more radical patenting activity in countries with low 
EPL. This is because radical innovations, despite being potentially more profitable require larger 




Investment and Human Capital  
Recent evidence (EC 2009) demonstrates that those countries with higher EPL have less ICT 
investment (controlling for other factors) and that strict EPL hinders the translation of ICT into 
productivity gains.  Gust and Marquez (2004) show that at aggregate level that a restrictive EPL may 
have hindered the adoption of ICT outside the US from the mid 1990s.The evidence regarding other 
institutional characteristics is rather mixed (EC 2009). Using an industry panel dataset for EU 
countries O’Mahony and Peng (2010) show that continuous training linked to ICT is a significant 
determinant of productivity growth. Peraita (2001) presents evidence on the impact of labour 
regulation on the incentives for firms to pay for the training in Spain, a country with high firing costs  
and a very centralised wage determination system (in which unions play a key role). He finds that 
high wage compression does not have an effect on the incentive for firms to invest in general 




Recent evidence shows that stringent hiring laws distort exporting decision of firms. Using firm-level 
data from 26 countries in Easter Europe and Central Asia, Seker (2010) shows that strict employment 
protection legislation discourages firms from exporting;  higher cost of labour decreases operating 
profits and lead to a higher threshold of productivity required for entering export markets. It is also 
shown that more costly labour regulation affects the ability for firms to create jobs, a fact that can 
make firms reluctant to enter foreign markets.  
 
Gross and Ryan (2008) analyse the role of EPL for regular and temporary employment on decisions 
by Japanese multinational enterprises on where to locate their FDI across otherwise similar 
economies within Western Europe. The conclusion is that EPL does have a negative effect on 
location decisions by Japanese firms and the negative effect comes mainly from the protection of 
regular employment and not from the protection of temporary employment . 
 
 
6. Sector-specific regulation 
Sectoral measurement of regulation started in the 1990s in the OECD23 and has led to the 
development of indicators for various service sectors: for the network industries, transport (air, rail 
and road), communication (post and telecoms), as well as for entry and conduct regulation in retail 
and professional business services.  
In a development from evaluating the impact of regulation on standard measures of economic 
performance directly, recently the economic literature has focused on the impact of regulation on 
competition. The economic rationale behind this effort is that competitive pressure itself is expected 
to influence performance measures such as productivity24, innovation25 and employment26 through 
static and dynamic efficiency gains accruing from a reduction in mark-ups and an increase in 
allocative efficiency27. This evidence has led to growing research interest in the construction of 
useful competitive measures to monitor the sector-specific competition performance and compare 
it to the regulatory environment28.  The focus of this literature review is on quantifying the extent to 
which anti-competitive regulation29 in certain services sector, as opposed to regulations in the public 
                                                 
23 See OECD (2008) for review. 
24 See Nickell (1996). 
25 See Ahn (2002), Aghion et al (2005), Nicoletti et al (2001), Bassanini and Ernst (2002) and Jaumotte and Pain (2005). 
26 See Nicoletti et al (2001), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) and Fiori et al (2007). 
27 Arnold et al (2008) show that anti-competitive regulations exert a negative impact on allocative efficiency especially in services industry 
and ICT-using sectors. 
28 See Høj et al (2007) and Molnar and Bottini (2008). 
29 See Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 
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interest (e.g. by addressing market failures) or intended to assure quality of services for 
consumers30, has an impact on performance.  
While there are numerous studies calculating the intensity of sector-specific competition31, only a 
few have tried to establish a link to the regulatory environment and competition. Høj et al (2007) 
and Molnar and Bottini (2008) estimated the sector-specific mark-ups of OECD countries and 
showed correlation statistics and simple econometric results for their relation to OECD regulation 
indicators.  
Despite action taken to liberalise retail trade services considerable differences in regulations across 
OECD countries persist in this service industry. Anti-competitive regulation includes zoning-laws 
(intended to mitigate deleterious effects that large peripheral outlets can have on small shops in 
town centres) and labour regulations. There is evidence suggesting that both types of regulation can 
have adverse effects on the overall degree of competition in retail markets32.  
Overall regression analyses carried out by Høj et al (2007) confirm that regulations (measured by 
PMR Indicators) that are less conducive to competition are positively and significantly correlated 
with mark-ups across countries, especially in the services sector. This correlation is strongest for the 
sub-components “barriers to trade and investments”, “entry barriers” and “economic regulation”. As 
the PMR index (see OECD 2005b) is an economy-wide measure of regulation this analysis was also 
carried out with a different set of regulation indicators, time averages of ECTR indicators (Energy, 
Transport and Communications) as well as sector-specific regulation indicators for trade, financial 
services and business services, confirming the results. Improving the measures for competitive 
pressures used, Molnar and Bottini (2008) carried out an additional analysis for the services sector. 
Their results also point to a high correlation between mark-ups in professional services and the 
OECD PMR indicators. 
 
6.1. Professional services 
Evidence from these studies suggests that the professional services sector, which is one of the most 
intensely regulated service sectors, shows the lowest degree of competition among market services. 
Whereas part of this might be attributable to their inherent characteristics, such as a high degree of 
informational asymmetry between service providers and their customers, restrictive market entry-
regulation requirements for national occupational qualifications for licensing, certification or 
registration foster the non-tradability of these services and therefore decrease competitive 
pressures33.  
Critical examination of the regulation of professional services emerged during the 1990s in the 
context of law and economics34. Empirical studies since have shown little evidence of a positive 
effect of regulation on consumer welfare35.  Nicoletti et al (2000) achieved the quantification of the 
degree of restrictiveness (in the sense of anti-competitiveness) by consolidating regulations on 
competitiveness (and also employment protection) into appropriate index measures, first for 
transport, retail and telecommunications.  Nguyen-Hong (2000) extended this approach by 
categorising restrictive barriers to trade in engineering, architectural, accountancy and legal services 
and consolidating these into country indices. Regulation indices for professional services (above 
mentioned plus notarial and retail pharmacy services) developed by IHS36 for the European 
                                                 
30 See Ogus (2000) for a discussion of self-regulation. 
31 See for example Przybyla and Roma (2005), Badinger and Breuss (2005,2006), Molnar (2010) or Borg (2009). 
32 Høj et al (2007). 
33 Compare Høj et al (2007) and Molnar and Bottini (2008). 
34 See Faure et al (1993), Gelking (1996), Stephen and Love(2000) and Ogus (2000). 
35 See Conway and Nicoletti (2006), OFT (2001) regarding professional services. 
36 See Paterson, Fink, Ogus et al (2003). 
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Commission37 were used to examine economic outcomes in terms of business volumes, employment 
and number of firms. Indications of a negative association between the degree of regulation and 
productivity were found for legal, accounting and technical services. 
The conclusion is that removing barriers to trade and for foreign direct investment, easing market 
access along a number of dimensions including nationality and residency requirements, easing 
zoning laws and limiting the degree of self-regulation by professional associations, would strengthen 
the competitive environment in European service sectors.  
 
6.2. Financial sector 
There are three major objectives of regulation and supervision (Brunnermeier et al, 2009; Goodhart 
et al, 1998): (i) to constrain the use of monopoly power, (ii) to protect smaller and less informed 
clients against failure or adverse behaviour of financial institutions, and (iii) to ensure systemic 
stability. While the first condition has been more commonly relevant in the case of utilities, ensuring 
fair and open competition and access to systems and information has been important in the financial 
sector. The second condition arises due to the losses caused by the failure of an individual financial 
institution to customers who are unable to assess the safety and the soundness of financial 
institutions. Accordingly, the need for prudential regulation and supervision arises due to the 
imperfect consumer information and the nature of the business, irrespective of systemic concerns. 
The case for systemic regulation, on the other hand, arises because social costs of the failure of a 
financial institution exceed the private costs and these costs are not internalized by the decision 
making of the firm, and that the social costs of market failure exceed both the private costs of failure 
and the costs of regulation. Systemic externalities involved in the failure of financial institutions 
which are not present in other industries make the third condition central in the case of regulation 
of banks and some key financial intermediaries.  
The current global crisis revealed significant weaknesses in the components of the safety nets 
created to limit the externalities created by bank failures. Bailing out the financial institutions during 
the crisis together with the proposed regulatory changes, on the other hand, raised concerns over 
the resulting market structure and the implications for the competition in the finance sector (Beck et 
al  2010). While the debate over a better and different financial regulatory and supervisory 
framework continues, the implication is that there is a need to understand better the interactions 
between regulations, competition, performance and stability in the financial services industry.   
 
This paper reviews the existing literature on competition and performance in the financial sector. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the empirical work 
on the financial regulatory framework and banking performance and stability in general. Section 3 
focuses on the subset of this literature that explicitly analyses the competition and performance and 
stability link in the financial sector. Section 4 discusses the consequences of the cross-border 
banking and foreign bank entry for the structure, competitiveness and stability in the target markets. 
Section 5 provides the conclusions together with a brief review of a new study to be undertaken. 
 
Financial regulations and banking performance  
 
Extensive financial reform and liberalization programs aimed at increasing competition and hence 
performance in banking sectors together with increased consolidation and presence of multinational 
banks have characterized the financial sectors of both developing and developed countries in recent 
years. While it is generally assumed that a liberalised regulatory framework will result in a more 
competitive and efficient banking sector and hence promote economic growth and welfare, the 
                                                 
37 Indices originally calculated for EU-15 were later extended to include EU-27 countries. 
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implications for the market stability have remained the main concern of the regulators. In the case 
of various emerging markets in particular financial sector liberalizations undertaken in adverse 
macro-economic conditions and underdeveloped legal and regulatory frameworks have been 
followed by financial crisis. In more recent years, financial innovations and across-business lines 
consolidation which created complex international conglomerates, and the cross-border financial 
sector dependencies have complicated the design of the regulatory framework (Claessens, 2006; 
Beck, 2008). 
 
One of the most prominent cross-country contributions on the relationship between financial 
supervision and bank performance and stability is provided by Barth et al (2004). By covering 107 
countries and employing a wide range of regulatory and supervisory indicators, the study fails to find 
a strong relationship between the official supervisory indicators and bank performance and stability, 
except for one indicator, the diversification index.  The findings suggest that policies that force 
accurate information disclosure, empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and foster 
incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, 
performance and stability. The authors hence advise against government policies that rely 
excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. Beck et al (2006), on 
the other hand, undertake an empirical analysis of the impact of national bank concentration, bank 
regulations, and banking fragility.  Using data on 69 countries from 1980 and 1997, the study finds 
that systemic banking crises are less likely in economies with concentrated banking systems 
supporting concentration-stability view. The results also show that fewer regulatory restrictions 
reduce banking system fragility while countries with institutions promoting competition have a 
lower probability of experiencing a systemic crisis implying that competition promotes stability. The 
authors, hence, note that concentration might be an inefficient measure of banking system 
competition. 
 
Gonzalez (2005) argues that the theoretical link between banking regulatory restrictions and stability 
is not clear without controlling for bank risk taking incentives. Greater freedom for banks can lead to 
banking stability by providing opportunities for wider diversification or alternatively undermine 
stability by providing opportunities for assuming higher risk. Using bank level data in 36 countries 
over 1995-1999, the empirical findings show that regulatory restrictions have a different effect on 
bank risk taking depending on bank charter value. It is found that weaker regulatory restrictions 
favor higher bank charter values and higher charter values of banks in countries with fewer 
regulatory restrictions provide incentives for banks to reduce risk. Banks in countries with stricter 
regulatory restrictions, however, have lower charter values that do not provide risk-reducing 
incentives.  In contrast to Barth et al (2004), it is found that fewer regulatory restrictions are 
associated with greater bank risk-taking after controlling for the effect of regulatory restrictions on 
bank charter value and the effect of bank charter value on risk-taking.  
 
In addition, recent contributions show that banks do respond to private governance mechanisms 
and hence point to the need for taking into account how a bank’s ownership and management 
structure interact with legal and regulatory environment in developing policy conclusions.  Caprio, et 
al (2007) document the ultimate owners of bank capital and the degree of voting rights and cash 
flow rights concentration for a cross-section of 48 countries and report that banks are generally not 
widely held, rather families or the state control banks. They find that larger cash flow rights by the 
controlling owner enhance bank valuations while weak shareholder protection laws lower bank 
valuations. Moreover, greater cash flow rights are found to be mitigating the negative impact of 
weak protection laws on valuations. Hence, the findings suggest that the ownership structure is an 
important mechanism for governing banks. Laeven and Levine (2009) study how corporate 
governance mechanisms interact with regulations in shaping bank risk taking using bank level data 
across 48 countries. They find that bank risk, measured by z-score, is higher in banks that have large 
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owners with high cash flow rights. More importantly, they show that the relationship between risk 
and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and activity restrictions depends on each bank’s 
ownership structure in that the sign of the effect of regulation on risk changes with ownership 
concentration. In particular, stricter capital regulations and more stringent activity restrictions are 
associated with greater risk when the bank has a sufficiently powerful owner. In the case of widely 
held banks, however, stricter capital regulations have the opposite effect.  
 
Some recent studies examine these issues in the context of the recent financial crisis. Ahrend et al 
(2009) examine the links between prudential regulation and competition and risk.  The analysis show 
that banks in countries with stronger prudential rules had been more stable and less severally 
affected by the financial crisis. Concerning the impact of stronger prudential policies on competition, 
the results fail to support the view that there is a trade-off between stability and competition. In 
particular the strength of the banking supervisor improves both stability and competition. The 
authors, however, note that in particular areas there are trade-offs: regulations concerning entry 
rules and ownership structures tend to weaken competition.  Beltratti and Stulz (2009), on the other 
hand, analyze the role of both bank level and country level corporate governance and regulation in 
the recent global crisis in a cross county study. Using market measures of performance, they find 
that pre-crisis bank level financial indicators are more important in determining the crisis 
performance of banks than the governance and regulatory indicators. Specifically they find that 
banks with more pro-shareholder boards performed worse during the crisis. Concerning regulations 
it is found that stronger supervisory authority had a negative effect on performance while stronger 
bank oversight was associated with better performance. 
 
Bank competition and performance and stability 
 
The extant research on bank competition follow two approaches: structural and non-structural. 
Under the structural approach competitive conduct of the banks are inferred through the analysis of 
the market structure i.e., the number and size distribution of firms in a market and the entry 
conditions. According to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm market structure 
determines the conduct, which, in turn, determines performance. As concentration in a market 
increases, firms with greater monopoly power can charge higher prices and hence profitability 
increases. According to the alternative efficient markets or relative efficiency (EM) paradigm, on the 
other hand, some firms earn superior profits because they are more efficient than other firms and 
greater efficiency results in higher market share. Although under both models, the relationship 
between market concentration and profits is positive, in the EM model market share (and 
concentration) is endogenously determined by the efficiency. Accordingly, the policy implications 
differ under both models: the SCP model calls for regulations and/or policies to control 
concentration while such measures are unnecessary under the EM model. Under the non-structural 
approach, on the other hand, competitive behaviour can exist in concentrated markets if existing 
firms are vulnerable to hit-and-run entry, i.e. when the markets are contestable. Then the 
implication is that there is no need for the governments to imply policies that will encourage greater 
market entry (Heffernan, 1996).  
 
Empirical research on the competitive environment and bank performance has not reached 
conclusive results. Studies following the structural approach employ proxies for the structure of the 
market such as concentration ratios and test the link between these variables and various 
performance measures. Studies that follow the non-structural approach, however, assess the 
competitive conditions explicitly first. Berger and Hannan (1998) for the US banking market test the 
‘quiet life hypothesis’ under which banks in concentrated markets take advantage of market power 
and incur higher costs. They find that banks in more concentrated markets have lower cost 
efficiency. Casu and Girardone (2006), on the other hand, employ both structural (concentration) 
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and non-structural (Panzar and Rosse (1987) statistics, or so-called “H-statistics”) measures for 
assessing competitive conditions in the EU banking markets in the aftermath of the introduction of 
the Single Banking License.  The findings suggest the existence of monopolistic competition in the 
Single Market. Further analysis of the determinants of competition reveals that the degree of 
concentration is not necessarily related to the degree of competition. They also find little evidence 
that more efficient banking systems are more competitive. Hence, they conclude that the 
relationship between competition and efficiency is not a straight one. Koetter et al (2008) noting 
that competition and efficiency are closely intertwined in banking derive an efficiency adjusted 
Lerner index and for the US Banking between 1986 and 2005 show that market power increased 
because of  banks’ efforts to improve both cost and profit efficiency supporting efficient structure 
rather than quiet life hypothesis.   
 
The literature analyzing the evolution of competition in the European markets in response to the 
deregulation process have not reached conclusive answers either. De Guevara et al  (2005), analyse 
the evolution of market power in the five EU countries’ banking systems over 1992-1999. They find 
that there is no increase in the degree of competition while there are substantial differences in 
market power across countries as measured by the Lerner index. Further analysis find that bank size, 
efficiency and default risk, and economic cycle are associated with market power while 
concentration and bank market share fail to be significant.  In a more recent study, however, Carbo 
et al (2009) undertake a cross country comparisons of competition in 14 European banking markets 
over 1995-2001 employing alternative measures (Lerner index, Net Interest Margin, Return on 
Assets and H-statistics) and find conflicting results within and across countries and over time. Their 
results show that when bank-level cost efficiency and the share of non-traditional revenue sources, 
and country-level output growth and inflation are controlled for, European banks’ pricing power 
seems weaker than found otherwise or by using traditional competition indicators. Bolt and 
Humphrey (2009), in addition, by employing a frontier approach to the measurement of 
competition, show that there can be different levels of market power in different market segments. 
Specifically they find that greater level of competition in the activities that generate spread income 
and lower level of competition in the non-interest income generating activities. They note that the 
results are in agreement with the observed decline of the importance of the former and increase of 
the importance in the latter in the banking revenues.  
 
A strand of this literature focuses on the implications of competition for stability. The theoretical 
literature on the relationship between competition and stability relationship in the financial sector 
fails to reach a conclusive answer. Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, initiated by the 
seminal paper of Keeley (1990), more banking competition leads to fragility by reducing banks’ 
franchise values and by providing incentives for increasing default risk. More recent literature, 
however, showed that the theoretical relationship between competition policy and stability is a 
complex one and the widely argued trade-off between competition and stability may not hold (Allen 
and Gale, 2004; Carletti and Hartmann, 2002). Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) showed that through a 
loan market risk channel higher market power in the loan markets leads to higher loan rates charged 
to customers who in turn optimally increase their own risk of failure.  
 
The empirical evidence on the competition and stability relationship is not clear either. While in 
some of the studies concentration levels are employed as a proxy for competition levels, more 
recent contributions note that market concentration and market competition are different concepts 
and hence have different impacts on stability (Beck and Levine, 2006 and Schaeck et al, 2009). In 
particular Schaeck, et al (2009) find that that both competition, measured by Panzar and Rosse H-
statistics and concentration, have independent effects on the timing and on the probability of 
systemic banking crises using data from 45 countries. They find that competition reduces the 
likelihood of a crisis and increases the time to crisis. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), on the other 
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hand, employ z-score and its components as measures of banking risk and find that concentration 
has a negative impact on financial stability in Europe supporting concentration-fragility view. They 
also note that the higher return volatility of larger banks in concentrated markets could be a likely 
reason for the negative impact of market concentration.  
 
Similarly, Agoraki et al (2009), note the interactions between regulations and market power and 
bank risk taking. Analyzing the Central and Eastern European banking sectors over 1998–2005, they 
find that banks with market power, measured by Lerner Index, have lower credit risk and a lower 
probability of default. In addition, capital requirements reduce risk in general, but for banks with 
market power this impact weakens or can even be reversed. While, higher activity restrictions 
together with more market power reduce both credit risk and the risk of default, official supervisory 
power has only a direct impact on bank risk.  
Berger et al (2009), on the other hand, argue that the ‘competition-fragility’ view and the alternative 
‘competition-stability’ view need not yield opposing predictions on the competition and stability link. 
Using various measures of market structure and risk, and based on 23 developed countries over 
1999-2005, they show that more market power is associated with riskier loan portfolios supporting 
the “competition-stability” view. At the same time, a positive relationship between market power, 
measured by Lerner index, and   the Z-index, inverse of overall risk measure, is found, supporting the 
“competition-fragility” view. Hence it is argued that while market power in the loan market leads to 
riskier loan portfolios, overall bank risks need not increase if the banks take measures to protect 
their higher franchise values due to their market power, for instance by holding higher equity 
capital.  
 
In a recent contribution Schaeck and Cihak (2010) assess the competition in banking with the Boone 
indicator which is based on the efficient structure hypothesis and measured as the strength of the 
relation between efficiency and performance. Using two datasets for Europe and the US the authors 
show that competition increases efficiency and that efficiency is the conduit through which 
competition improves bank soundness. With important policy implications, further analysis show 
that banks’ responses to competition are not homogenous and that soundness enhancing impact of 
competition is stronger for sound banks rather than for weak banks. 
 
Ensuring a competitive and sound financial system is crucial due to its implications for economic 
growth and efficiency. The interactions between market power, performance and stability however 
complicate the design of an effective financial regulatory framework that promotes competition and 
efficiency while maintaining stability. The existing theoretical and empirical literature on the link 
between competition and performance and soundness and the role of regulations in promoting 
competitive and sound financial systems has failed to reach unambiguous results. 
 
While there seems to be evidence that concentration is not a proper measure of competition, there 
is no consensus on how best to measure competition in the finance industry. Employing different 
methodologies the studies that assess the evolution of competition in the European financial 
markets reach conflicting answers. Hence, further research that will simultaneously employ 
alternative measures of competition is necessary. Besides, competition should also be measured at 
segments of the financial markets: for instance interest earning activities vs. non-interest earning 
activities. Determinants of competition should also be analysed more explicitly. In particular, the 
relationship between efficiency and market power has not been clearly established yet. Likewise, 
concerning the link between stability and competition the existing research has yet to reach 
conclusive findings. In addition to the irregularities in the measurement of competition as 
mentioned above, there are irregularities in the measures of stability. While some studies employ 
systemic crisis episodes as market soundness measures, others employ market or accounting based 
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measures of bank risk. Corporate governance structures and cross-border financial links also 
complicate the relationships between regulations, competition and bank risk taking. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Research on the links between product market regulation and performance at industry level has 
been traditionally scarce mainly due to the lack of suitable data. Over the last years the development 
by the OECD of indicators on anti-competitive regulation for key non-manufacturing sectors, such as 
utilities, transport and communications, has prompted  a surge on empirical research analysing the 
impacts of regulation on economic performance in those sectors. More recently the focus has 
widened to analyse the indirect impact that regulation of those highly regulated services has on 
other sectors of the economy, using an approach that combines product market/regulation indices 
with input-output data 38. 
Despite initial evidence suggesting that the impact of regulation is likely to be higher in those 
industries that use more intensively intermediate inputs from highly regulated services sectors, the 
transmission channels remain unclear and methodological issues remain a challenge. The 
development of alternative indicators on the burden of regulation of services sectors (within 
INDICSER) should provide us with additional tools that allows us to understand the forces driving the 
observed links between regulation and economic outcomes.  
The effects of regulation in specific sectors such as professional services and retail trade may also 
have a considerable “knock-on” effect in other sectors. Input-Output tables show, for example that 
professional services are delivered as intermediary input to a wide range of manufacturing, utility 
and other service industries. A similar approach than the one followed by the OECD may offer 
extended scope for evaluating the economic effects of regulation in order to guide policy. A causal 
study in the course of the SERVICEGAP project isolating the economic impact on the professional of 
(updated) anti-competitive regulation indices from other factors would enable stronger policy 
positions to be formulated. 
Further research on the link between regulation and competition should consider recently 
developed indicators that are better capable of mapping competition within a sector, such as profit 
elasticity, as suggested by Boone et al (2007). Furthermore, establishing causal links between 
regulation and competition should also take into account other factors that might influence mark-
ups, such as human capital employed in a sector/firm, the degree of innovation of a sector/firm as 
well as different degrees of productivity across sectors/firms. These might explain part of higher 
mark-ups in some sectors independently of the degree of regulation.  
We have seen that there are interactions between regulations, market power, performance and 
stability that complicate the design of financial sector regulation. While the early literature has 
ignored the interactions between the regulations and the role of the market structure and market 
power, the recent literature has focused, in additions to these interactions, on the role of 
institutional and corporate governance structures and cross-border financial links in determining 
bank risk taking. In view of the new mechanisms and channels through which market structure can 
affect stability as revealed in the current crisis, the existing evidence on the interactions between 
regulations, competition, and stability in the financial services industry needs to be re-assessed.  
 
Labour regulation is by nature economy-wide but recent research (Bassanini et al, 2009) has 
investigated whether employment protection has particular adverse effects in industries with high 
labour redundancy rates such as manufacturing. This research angle could also potentially be applied 
to the service sector. This said, we do now have a long time-varying indicator of EPL, and it seems 
that it would be possible to use it to interact with service and non-service industries as Bassanini et 
                                                 
38 See Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 
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al (2009) do to improve estimates of the impact of EPL on labour productivity in the services. The 
lack of time variation has traditionally been highlighted in the literature as major constraint when 
evaluating the extent to which changes in labour market institutions explain changes in labour 
market outcomes (Nickel et al, 2005). This paper has discussed advances that need to be made both 
in regard to developing indicators of labour regulation (INDICSER), and applying these to explain 
services productivity. Despite the advances in the development of new indicators of labour market 
regulations none of the indicators apply particularly to services. To link with services productivity we 
will have to make use of the fact that labour regulation, and particularly EPL may bear down less 
hard on services given that services have fewer layoffs/redundancies. Given this path forward, 
experiments need to be made with different dependent variables, including total factor productivity, 
speed of employment adjustment, and measures of innovation and entrepreneurship.  
 
In view of the literature on financial regulation reviewed here and the new mechanisms and 
channels through which market structure affects stability as revealed in the current financial crisis, 
we propose to study the interactions between market power and performance and stability in the 
context of Central and Eastern European banking markets. Two factors motivate the choice of these 
countries as a study sample. First, as uncovered in the preceding review, there are only a few studies 
that focus on these economies. Second, the varying financial reform experiences, in terms of the 
starting conditions and the speed, of these countries will allow an analysis of the dynamic 
relationship between the evolution of market competition and performance in response to the 
changing financial regulatory framework.  
 
The analysis by employing alternative measures will first assess the evolution of market 
concentration and competition in these markets. Next the relationship between efficiency 
performance and stability and market competition will be analysed. The performance will be 
measured with the application of the frontier efficiency methods. The analysis will take into account 
the impact of the regulatory framework together with bank-level ownership controls. Transition 
index of EBRD and its sub-indices related to the regulatory changes in the financial services industry 
(index of banking sector reforms, index of non-banking financial institutions reforms and index of 
competition policy reforms) will be used to control for the regulatory environment. Bank level 
financial data will be accessed through Bureau van Dyke’s Bankscope data base. The time frame will 
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